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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Another issue will arise in cases where the motion pictures are offered
merely to illustrate the evidence. Photographs for this purpose were ad-
mitted in Smith v. Territory (1902) 11 Okla. 669, 69 Pac. 805; and Fulton
v. Chouteau County Farmers' Co. (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1934) 37 Pac. (2nd)
1025. For further discussion as to the general problem of motion pictures,
see note, 36 Law Notes 108-10, 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2nd ed., 1923) sec.
798, and R. C. Beckett, Motion Pictures in Evidence (1932) 27 Il1. Law
Rev. 424-7. J. C. L. '36.
INFANTS-JUVENILE COURTS-JURISDICTION OVER CRIMMs.-Daniecki was
indicted, tried, and convicted for murder in a criminal court. Daniecki peti-
tions for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that at the time of the
murder he was a minor under the age of 16, and should have been tried by
a juvenile court. A statute had vested the juvenile court with exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine all cases against a child under 16 who
was charged with committing any offense or act for which he could be
prosecuted; all such cases were to be tried by a judge without a jury; it was
further provided that no child could be tried for a crime except with the
consent of the judge of the juvenile court, who in his discretion might trans-
fer the case to a criminal court. Comp. St. of New Jersey Supp. 1930, see.
53. Held, the statute is unconstitutional as regards indictable offenses where
the constitutional right to trial by jury exists. The vice of the statute
is in creating a juvenile court to try all manner of crime and subjecting
the culprit to a possible trial by a judge without a jury. Ex parte Daniechi,
(New Jersey, Feb., 1935), 177 Atl. 91.
The statutes of the various states vary as to the forum in which the
juvenile delinquents are to be tried. The majority of the states leave the
matter to the discretion of the judge of the juvenile court except where a
serious felony is involved. State v. Alexander (Okla. Cr. 1921), 196 Pac.
969; Johnson v. Cor. (1917), 176 Ky. 339, 195 S. W. 818. He may transfer
the case to a criminal court or keep it in the juvenile court. The basis for
his decision is whether the child is incorrigible or not. Powell v. State
(1932), 96 Ala. 936, 141 So. 201; Ashley v. Commonwealth (1930), 236 Ky.
543, 33 S. W. (2d) 614; Wigging v. State (Tenn. 1927), 289 S. W. 498;
People -vs. Ross (1926), 235 Mich., 433, 209 N. W. 663; State v. Burnett
(N. C. 1920), 102 S. E. 711; People v. Woeff (1920), 182 Cal. 728, 190
Pac. 22; Ex fparte Powell (1912), 6 Okla. Cr. 495, 120 Pac. 1022; State ex
rel. Johnson v. Quigg (Fla. 1922), 90 So. 695. In these states the juvenile
court is vested with exclusive original jurisdiction except in serious felony
cases and if a minor gets into a criminal court it is the duty of the crim-
inal court to transfer the case immediately to the juvenile court. Compton
v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1922), 240 S. W. 36; Ex parte Hightower (Okla.
1907), 165 Pac. 624.
The old idea of "guilt" and the right to trial by jury to ascertain guilt
still prevails in some of the states as to the delinquent. In these states the
minor has a right to trial by jury on demand. However, in cases of serious
felony a criminal trial would be mandatory. Colorado provides for a jury
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trial on demand with concurrent jurisdiction in the juvenile and the crim-
inal court, of an infant over 18. That is the court first acquiring juris-
diction controls the case and may transfer it to the other court at its dis-
cretion. Under 18 the juvenile court has exclusive original jusisdiction,
with discretion vested in the juvenile court judge. Missouri and Texas also
have similar provisions. Col. Law 1909, chp. 158; People v. Morley (Col.
1925), 234 Pac. 178; State ex rel Boyd v. Rutledge (Mo. 1928), 13 S. W.
(2nd) 1061; State ex rel Walker (Mo. 1930), 34 S. W. (2d) 124; State ex
rel Mae Nish v. Landwehr (Mo. 1933), 60 S. W. (2d) 4; R. S. Mo. 1929,
sec. 14137, 14163; Valdez v. State (Tex. 1924), 265 S. W. 261, Davis v.
State (Texas 1916), 188 S. W. 990; 14 St. Louis Law Review 429.
Iowa stands in a unique position. The juvenile court does not have ex-
clusive original jurisdiction but has discretion in regard to the forum and
the mode of trial in cases arising before it. The juvenile court may transfer
a case to the criminal court and the criminal court has similar jurisdiction.
There is no mandatory jurisdiction vested in the juvenile court. State v.
Reed (Iowa 1928), 218 N. W. 609, note (1928) 14 St. Louis L. Rev. 429.
Juvenile court statutes are upheld on the theory that the delinquent is
not on trial for the commission of a crime, and that the reformatory to which
he is committed is a place where reformation and not punishment is the
end sought to be obtained. Here provision for jury trial is usually held to
be unnecessary. Com. v. Fisher (1905), 213 Pa. St. 48, 62 AtI. 198, 5 Ann
Cas. 192; Marlowe v. Com. (Ky. 1911), 133 S. W. 1137, note, (1928) 14 St.
Louis L. Rev. 430. In all states the statutes provide for a class of cases
that must be tried in a criminal court. Louisiana permits exclusive juris-
diction to the juvenile court except in capital cases. State V. Howard (La.
1910), 52 So. 539. Florida provides for criminal proceedings in rape, bur-
glary, arson, murder and manslaughter. State ex rel Inlertandi v. Pette-
way (1934) 114 Fla. 850, 55 So. 319. In Iowa and Georgia the offense
must be punishable by life imprisonment or death before a criminal pro-
ceeding is required. State v. Reed (Iowa 1928) 218 N. W. 609; Hicks v.
State (Ga. 1917) 92 S. E. 217.
The legislature should not confer mandatory jurisdiction to try all cases
upon the juvenile court for then the basis of such legislation would be the
untenable view that all minors are capable of reformation. Doubtless cases
are presented where the moral decadence has reached such an advanced
stage that efforts at reformation would be fruitless. Thus the majority
view providing for discretionary power in the juvenile court judge for the
less serious offenses is the most desirable. Note (1928) 14 St. Louis L.
Rev. 429-431. Contra, Lous, Juvenile Courts in U. S., p. 37. The principal
case falls within the majority view. The juvenile judge had no jurisdic-
tion because the crime was a serious felony for which a criminal trial was
mandatory. The question then arises, whether or not the juvenile court
should have exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases, including the
serious felonies, with discretionary power in the juvenile court judge. This
would be going too far. The more serious crimes should be retained by the
criminal court or the criminal law will be undermined. Note (1926) Wign-
more, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 375-376. R. L. S. '37.
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